독도 에세이 콘테스트 수상

Biased judgment, geopolitical context led to omission

Tomasz Wierzbowski willowpol@hotmail.com Tomasz Wierzbowski is a 28-year-old Polish researcher at the European Union Chamber of Commerce in Korea. He majored in Korean philology in his home country and came to Korea in 2008. He obtained a master’s degree in Political Science at Sungkyunkwan University in 2011.

The so-called “Dokdo territorial dispute,” based on groundless Japanese claims, is not an issue with origins in Korea-Japan relations.

It actually emerged from U.S.-Japan relations during the preparation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. During this preparation Dokdo was just a small piece of a bigger game.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan was an international agreement signed by 48 nations on Sept. 8, 1951. It entered into force on April 28, 1952.

This treaty officially ended the Pacific War and generally determined order in the region by formally ending the Japanese military empire.

The agreement redefined Japanese territory and was supposed to become a starting point for post-War Korea-Japan relations.

Fatefully, however, the treaty’s Chapter II, Article 2a, which defines Japan’s territory, did not mention Dokdo as territory to be renounced to Korea.

This controversial decision created ambiguity and gave Japanese decision-makers legal pretext to advance groundless claims over Korean inherent territory. Thus began officially the “Dokdo territorial dispute.”

Although Dokdo was not mentioned in the treaty’s final version, it was clearly identified as one of the “offshore Korean islands” in the first five drafts of the agreement, which go back as far as 1946.

Those five drafts – the last dating to Nov. 2, 1949 – specified that Dokdo should be excluded from the list of Japanese territories and renounced to Korea.

But less than one month afterward, in December 1949, the sixth draft contained a diametrical change, as Takeshima (Dokdo) was included in the areas that were to remain Japanese territory.

What happened? William Sebald, U.S. political adviser to the Supreme Commander Allied Powers in Japan, appears to be a key figure in this alteration.

Sebald took the post of the head of the Diplomatic Section of the SCAP – the principal civilian position in Japan during post-War period – only accidently, as his predecessor died in an airplane crash.

He even took the position over some objection from the U.S. State Department. In any event his appointment was fortunate for Japan and bad luck for Korea.

Sebald, an experienced Japanophile who married into a Japanese family, suggested that Takeshima should be considered Japanese.

He provided two rationales.

One was “historical validity.” Japanese lobbying of the U.S. government, based on dubious historical pamphlets outlining its territory, intended to influence the forthcoming peace treaty.

And indeed Sebald argued that the claims were “old and appeared valid,” and “it is difficult to regard them as islands off the shore of Korea.”

Perhaps he was unprejudiced, but one is skeptical considering Sebald’s acquaintance with leading Japanese figures, including the royal family and right-wing political leaders. Sebald even lavishly praised the Japanese Emperor, despite his status as a war criminal.

Sebald’s second stated reason was strategic considerations.

He justified the disposition of Takeshima to Japan by saying that “security considerations might also conceivably render the provision of weather and radar stations on these islands a matter of interest to the U.S.”

Geopolitical history is useful to understand this.

In 1949, as the Cold War was escalating due to Communist expansion (including into China), Japan was viewed as the keystone regional ally for U.S. strategy in Asia.

Given its ambiguous future, Korea was relegated in importance.

Indeed at the time there was the possibility that communists might dominate the whole peninsula. Thus it was preferable for the U.S. to hedge its commitments and not claim Dokdo for Korea.

In June 1950, the Korean War began, and subsequently U.S. treaty drafts, including the final version, no longer mentioned “Dokdo” as territory belonging to Korea or Japan.

There are two explanations for this change. Two months before the Korean War started U.S. statesman John Dulles was appointed to oversee drafting of the treaty.

He decided to make the treaty text simpler and more comprehensible, as previous drafts were lengthy and detailed.

The names and descriptions of many islands, including Dokdo, were deleted. Even then U.S. policymakers knew that such simplicity might lead to future territorial disputes.

Thus they added a clause (Chapter VI, Article 22) stating that territorial disputes arising from the treaty shall be governed by the International Court of Justice.

The second explanation is also rooted in the geopolitical context. Making the treaty less detailed gave the U.S. future maneuvering room.

The primary objective of U.S. policy was to secure Japan for the Western bloc. It was America’s national interest not to allow Japan to settle its territorial disputes with China and Russia, to prevent it from mending relations with communist states.

As the Korean War dragged on and the Chinese invaded the peninsula, Korea’s future was uncertain.

Thus U.S. strategists thought it prudent to leave a gap between Japan and undecided Korea.

Following the treaty’s signing Korea ensured its rights over Dokdo by declaring the Syngman Rhee Line.

Together with the coastguard post and administrative control, it has been unquestionably an act manifesting sovereignty over Korean territory.

Although Japan’s claims officially remain, they will always remain unjustified.